International Mobility and Movement of Capital by Robert W. Gillespie
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: International Mobility and Movement of Capital





Chapter Title: THE POLICIES OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND GERMANY AS RECIPIENTS OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT
Chapter Author: Robert W. Gillespie
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3468
Chapter pages in book: (p. 397 - 442)I
THE POLICIES OF ENGLAND,
• FRANCE, AND GERMANY AS
• RECIPIENTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT
• INVESTMENT
ROBERT W. GILLESPIE •University of Illinois
• at Urbana
INTRODUCTION
THE growth of long-term international capital movements is widely
recognized as one of the important economic phenomena in the post-
war world economy. Long-term capital movements have, of course,
played an important historic role in earlier periods of the world econ-
omy. One aspect of the postwar period that distinguishes it from the
earlier experience is the quantitative importance of foreign direct in-
vestment and the emergence of the multinational firm as an important
agent in the capital-transfer process.' Another aspect unique to the
NOTE:The author gratefully acknowledges research support provided by the Uni-
versity of Illinois' Center for International Comparative Studies and the valuable as-
sistance of Mr. Willard Radell, who carried out much of the library research.
It has been suggested that the multinational firm exists and grows quite independently
of any capital movement in the traditional sense. There is much to be said for this view,
particularly since the United States government imposed restrictions on American di-
rect investment financed in the domestic capital market. To the extent that foreign-
ownership control, per Se, of domestic firms affects economic policy or behavior, the
emphasis is correctly placed on this aspect rather than on the capital movement aspect.
This view has been developed and expounded by S. Hymer. See C. P. Kindleberger,
American Business Abroad, New Haven, 1969, pp. 11 if. Also see Christopher Layton,
Trans-AtlanticInvestment, Paris,1968,fora good review and critique of this discus-
sion.
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postwar period is the rapid growth of capital movements in the form
of foreign direct investment between developed nations, in earlier pe-
riods, the flow was primarily from developed to underdeveloped coun-
tries or from mother countries to colonies. Flows of direct investment
between developed nations not only raise new issues, but the old issues
assume a different significance in the new setting.2
The purpose of this paper is to review some of these issues by ex-
amining the policies of England, France, and Germany toward direct
investment by foreign firms during the postwar period. We shall seek
to determine the degree to which these policies have been restrictive
in nature, and the rationale behind these restrictive aspects. This ra-
tionale is of interest because the governments of all three countries—
through their participation in postwar international agreements —have
explicitly endorsed freedom of capital movements as a desirable pot-
icy.
We shall examine the policy actions and the rationalizations for S
theseactions on their own terms, and within their own frame of anal-
ysis, rather than attempting an independent specification of the relevant
economic effects. The latter approach, though extremely valuable,
would be difficult, and it is not attempted here. Rather, we restrict our-
selves to an examination of the effects suggested by policymakers as
the important ones. Their views may not be accurate, or not even rele-
vant, within certain frames of reference; nevertheless, they are strongly
held and, consequently, become a reality in the formulation of policy.
For this reason, evaluating and understanding them is important.
The three countries that we are dealing with have been selected to
permit a comparative analysis. They obviously have much in common
as the three major industrialized nations in Western Europe. But, as
we shall show, there are also significant differences, which have af-
fected their policies toward foreign direct investment.
2The discussion of the "technology gap" is intimately related to the emergence of the
modern firm. The literature is quite extensive on this but for a general
summary see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, COPS in
Technology:General Report, Paris, 1968. For one view of the sovereignty aspect, see
Raymond Vernon, "Economic Sovereignty at Ray," Foreign Affairs. October, 1968.• A. LegislativeBasisfor theControl ofInward Investment3
Of the three countries being studied, only the United Kingdom still
exercises formal control of inward investment by means of exchange-
control regulations — regulations which derive from the Exchange Con-
trol Act passed in 1947. The Act itself gives the Treasury very broad
and substantial powers for controlling payments between United King-
• dom residents and nonresidents of the sterling area. As is not unusual
in the United Kingdom, the legislation leaves great powers of inter-
pretation to the discretion of the Treasury, which, in turn, delegates
operational control to the Bank of England. This procedure permits
substantial flexibility in policy, since the Treasury is able to alter pol-
icy by issuance of directives, without recourse to Parliament.
As this is being written, exchange-control regulations technically
permit free inward investment by nonresidents if the investment is
being effected through the purchase of securities quoted on the Stock
Exchange. A formal exception is the stipulation that Treasury permis-
sion is required if the purchase will result in transfer of control (more
than 50 per cent of the voting shares) from the domestic company to a
nonresident. As a practical matter, however, the "complete" freedom
of inward investment is only nominal, since, without specific approval,
• any subsequent repatriation would have to be made through an ex-
change rate of the pound sterling at a discount from the official rate.
Thus, even if a purchase involves less than 50 per cent of the shares,
permission must still be obtained to insure repatriation rights.
The effects of these regulations are twofold. First, they insure that
foreign investments are financed by a capital inflow rather than by
borrowing in the London capital market; hence, they produce an im-
mediate increase in foreign-exchange reserves. The second effect, and
3This discussion benefited greatly from Leslie F. Murphy. "Investing in the United
Kingdom." Conference on Financial and Economic Decisions for United Kingdom
Operations, American Management Association, New York, September,966.
r
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one more relevant for the discussion which follows, is that they pre-
vent loss of control to foreigners of firms in industries considered vital
to the interests of the United Kingdom. We shall now turn toan exami-
nation of what the interests of the United Kingdomare felt to be, and
what methods other than outright prohibition of foreign investments
are used to protect these interests.
B. The Conservative Government's Policy, 1 952—65
Given the very general legislative basis for controlling foreign in-
vestment, one must look to specific cases to determine how the
granted authority has been applied in practice. This method is ad-
mittedly selective, for it leaves out any potential investments which
have been either submitted for approval, failing to receive it—or else
so coolly received that the applications were subsequently withdrawn
without the publicity that a formal disapproval might evoke. There is
no way to document the precise number of such cases, since the appli-
cations need never become a matter of public record. Judging from off-
the-record answers to inquiries about the number of suchcases given
by government officials, one would conclude that the number is small—
and may even be zero.
During this period, several cases of foreign investmentwere im-
portant enough to precipitate a Parliamentary debate, thus requiring
the Government to take an explicit policy position: the Texas Oil
Company's purchase of Trinidad OilCompany(1956); the American
Ford Company's purchase of the minority equity in British Ford held
by residents of the United Kingdom (1960); and the purchases by the
Chrysler Corporation that finally gave it controlling interest in British
Rootes Motors (1964, 1967). These casesare well known; only the
policy position that emerged need be summarized here.4
The Conservative Government studied each of theserequests
with some care but ultimately approved all three of them uncondi-
tionally. The major factors cited by the Government in support of its
policy were the strengthening of the balance of payments that would
result; the benefits that American technology would bringto the
Hansard, Vol.554. June 14 and June 20, 1956; Vol. 731, July 12, 1966. The Trinidad
Oil Company:Proposed Purchase by rhe TexasCompany(1956),Cmd. 9790, p. 5.INVESTMENT POLICY IN U.K., FRANCE, AND GERMANY401
economy; and the need to protect British investment abroad from re-
taliatory restrictive policies.
C.TheLabourGovernment's Policy,1965—69
Although the Labour Party's opposition to Government approval
of the transfers cited above was spirited,5 it was not based upon a
closely reasoned argument, rather it was inherently a dislike of foreign
control of British firms. Nevertheless, the Labour Party's own policy
after 1965wasnot significantly different.6 Doctrinaire standards were
not applied; the policy was to judge each case on its individual merits.
The first major application of Labour policy came in 1967 when
the Government approved Chrysler's proposal to increase its minority
holdings in Rootes Motors toacontrolling interest. What differentiated
this approval from similar actions by the Conservative Party Govern-
ment was the attachment of several conditions regarding export efforts
and the stipulation that the majority of the Directors would remain
British. Even more significant was the further stipulation that the
Government would participate in the firm as a minority stockholder,
with representation on the Board of Directors. This move was designed
to insure that the "national interest" would be formally represented in
the Board room. Financial participation by the Government repre-
sents a major departure from Conservative practice, which in similar
circumstances was limitedto attempts to induce privateBritish
capital sources to aid domestic firms in financial difficulty.
Apart from this, the policy of the Labour Government differed
little from that of its predecessor when faced with similar foreign take-
overs. Both Governments were equally constrained by immediate
balance-of-payments needs, by fears that the investment might be
transferred to a European competitor, and by a desire not to precipi-
tate restrictive treatment of British investment abroad. Faced with
these constraints, the Labour Government expressed its somewhat
greater concern over possible deleterious effects of foreign investment
by adopting policies designed to strengthen the structure of domestic
industry.
5lbid.
Hansard,Vol.731, July 12, 1966, p. 1196. Compare with the statementof the Con-
servative Government in the Trinidad Oil White Paper, p. 9.
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One form which this policy took was the establishment of legisla-
tion giving the Government significant power both to prevent mergers
and to stimulate reorganization. Two major parts of this legislation are
the Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965 and the Industrial Reorgani-
zation Corporation Act of 1966. Interestingly, one of the first cases o
referred to the Monopolies Commission under the 1965 act—the take-
over of Pressed Steel Company by British Motors Corporation—re- f
suited in a favorable report, at least in part because the proposed merger
was between two domestic firms. One reason that the Commission saw
this merger as desirable was that it would prevent a take-over of Pressed p
Steel by a foreign firm.7
Another effort by the Labour Government to strengthen the struc-
ture of domestic industry was the creation in 1966 of the Industrial c
Reorganization Corporation. The IRC was charged to promote or as-
sist the reorganization or development of any industry on its own mi- b
tiative, or upon request by the Secretary of State,8 through the market
purchase of equity shares, or by loans (either direct or arranged with
private lenders). The IRC began operation with its participation in the
Chrysler-Rootes take-over. Since then it has sought to promote ration-
alization of various sectors of British industry. The general goals are
to create larger and more efficient British-owned industrial firms that
will (not incidentally) be less vulnerable to foreign take-overs. The
recent IRC involvement in promoting a merger of the three largest
British bearing manufacturers was at least partly motivated by a pro-
spective foreign take-over of one of these firms.9
In summary, when one looks at the policy of the United Kingdom
toward foreign direct investment during the postwar period (where this
policy is strictly defined to encompass only legal or administrative re-
strictions and major official statements), the policy would have to be
characterized as basically and consistently liberal or unrestrictive.
Concern over investments by foreign firms—especially when these
would involve take-overs of British-owned firms—has, instead, been
Monopolies Commission, TheBritish Motor Corporation Ltd. and the Pressed
Steel Company Ltd.: A Report on the Merger, London,1966, p. 16.
industrialReorganization Corporation Act, /966,London, 1966, P. 2.
9"IRC Statement on the U.K. Ball and Roller Bearing Industry," printed in full in
TheEconomist, May24, 1969, p. 76.
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manifestedin attempts to restructure industries that are vulnerable to
• take-overs and in which domestic ownership is felt to be in the "na-
tional interest." In such industries, policy has been aimed at main-
• taming intact a significant vertically integrated share under domestic
• ownership.
• . Certainbroad criteria for defining the national interest emerge
from these recent actions. Industries which are large and produce
traded goods (i.e., exports and import substitutes) are felt to involve
the national interest both through their implications for the balance of
payments and through their quantitative importance in the over-all
level of economic activity (e.g., the automotive and petroleum indus-
• tries). The national interest has also become associated with domestic
control of industries which are experiencing rapid technological change
—in particular, all science-based industries. This association has thus
- becomemore extensive than the accepted concern for protecting the




During the period under consideration, French policy toward for-
t eign investment has been characterized by major shifts. Furthermore,
- thesepolicy changes were more often hinted at than explicitly an-
nounced by new legislation or directives. For both of these reasons, it
• will be necessary to review French policy in somewhat greater de-
s tail.
The volatility of French policy is the more surprising when one
e considers that France has entered into several international agreements
designed toliberalize capital movements, and which, technically,
e should have significantly restrained the policies of that nation. Among
n these are the bilateral treaty between France and the United States
guaranteeing the right of establishment to each other's nationals (1959);
the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements of the Organization
• . forEconomic Cooperation and Development (1960); and Articles 52,
58, and 67 of the Treaty of Rome (1958). Although the legal implica-r
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tions of these agreements are undeniably important, they lie beyond
• the scope of this paper.'° /
• A. Policy Under Finance Minister G.-d'Estaing,1962—65
• In the postwar period up to 1962, French officials were clearly
hospitable to new foreign investments, both for the immediate balance-
of-payments effects and for the creation of real capital that was gen-
erally directly associated with the financial flow. The balance-of-pay-
ments effect was insured because new foreign investments had to be
financed with funds brought in from abroad. This, however, was a corn-
mon feature of the exchange-control systems of Western European
countries during this period. The policy during this era could be char-
acterized as favorable but restrained," and a steady increase in foreign
S
direct investment in France took place.
Beginning in late 1962, and continuing through 1965, French pol-
icy entered a new and decidedly more hostile phase. To recognize this
change, it is necessary to refer to particular cases, each of which has
received sufficient publicity to make it somewhat of a cause célèbre.
Although the events are well known, and some have been subjected to tj
extensive analysis,'2 they will be briefly summarized here for purposes 1
ofinterpretation.
11
Two American-owned plants, a GM-Frigidaire plant near Paris
and a Remington Rand plant at Lyons manufacturing portable type-
writers and office furniture, announce.d substantial layoffs. Official
S
French reaction to these layoffs was prompt and highly critical.'3 The
official criticism emphasized a common theme—the irresponsibility of
tlj
foreign control. The action of these firms did not conform to the ac- 11
tn
'°Co,,ventions of Establishment Bet,,een the United States of A merica and France,
signedat Paris, November 25, 1959. For a legal view of recent French policy in the.
light of the obligations of this treaty, see Charles Torem and William L. Craig, "Control
of Foreign Investment in France," Michigan LawReview,February, 1968, pp. 669—720. p
"SeeRosine Dusart, "The impact of the French Government on American Invest-
ment in France," HarvardInternational Lan' Journal,Winter, 1965, pp. 75—112. for the
development of these regulations.
Allan Vt!. Johostone, United States Direct In,'est,neni in France: A,, I,,vestigat:on
of French Charges, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965 and Dusart, op. cit.,p.78.
Both the Minister of industry, M. Maurice Bokanowski, and the Minister of Fi- ce
nance, M. Valery Giscard-d'Estaing, commented critically on these layoffs. Christia,, a
Science Monitor, October 6. 1962, p. 5. thi
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cepted French practice of prior consultation by management with the
State when significant layoffs were planned.
The dispassionate analysis of these events by Allan W. Johnstone
confirms the charge that no prior consultation was made; however, the
• actions of the firms were not nearly so callous as press reports and offi-
ly cial indignation suggested. The labor market was quite tight, so that
e- layoffs would result in only temporary unemployment for most workers,
and the firms themselves had undertaken to find employment for many
workers in anticipation of the layoffs.
In retrospect, the facts strongly suggest that the official reaction
was motivated by considerably more than the events themselves. Not
•UI only were the firms not publicly credited with the concern they did
show, but the economic forces that initiated the firms' actions were
• generated within the EEC. The Remington Rand decision was a move
to rationalize their production facilities within the EEC, and the GM-
Frigidaire redundancy was caused by refrigerator imports from
•Is Italy.
•35 Within a few months of these two events, it was announced that
e. theChrysler Corporation had acquired a controlling interest in the
to Simca automobile firm. Chrysler had purchased a 25 per cent share in
1958, and now had purchased another 38 per cent from other foreign
owners. Had the owners been French, the approval of the French gov-
ernment would have been required, but since the owners who were 4
al selling to Chrysler were not French, no such approval was necessary
under existing French law. The official French reaction to the transac-
• tion in question was publicly critical.'4 Moreover, as noted below,
French regulations were subsequently changed to bring such transac-
tions within the reach of French law.
The official concern expressed during late 1962 and early 1963
was in sharp contrast to the lack of specific criticism during the earlier
postwar period.'5 Numerous unattributed reports and public statements
by French officials now extended the criticism from these specifically
•on The Economist, February9,1963,pp. 495—496.
• "This is not to say that U.S. economic influences had evoked no earlier public con-
•Fi- cern. See, for example, the New York Times, October 19, 1961, p. 8, fora rejection of
•an a "gadget civilization" and the "creation of artificial needs," both of which characterize
the "American Way of Life."
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French experiences to the broader issue of foreign economic domina-
tion of the entire EEC.16
This sudden fear of foreign—that is, American--domination can
be better understood if viewed simultaneously with other events of the
period, especially the application of Great Britain for entry into the
Common Market. Preliminary negotiations had been under way for
several months when President de Gaulle abruptly announced the
French veto on January 14, 1963. The threat of Anierican domination
was posed in two ways: first, through the "special relationship" exist-
ing between the United States and England; and second, through Amer-
ican firms operating within the EEC. The French veto unilaterally
countered the first threat. However, a similar "French solution" to the
second problem was much more difficult to achieve.
During 1963, the French attempted to raise direct investment by
American firms to the level of a Community problem by bringing the
issue before the meetings of the EEC finance ministers.17 The minis-
ters, however, gave little support to the French position that a Corn-
munity policy was needed to prevent excessive American investment.
The consensus of the other members was that any Community response
to the question of foreign investment could only be based upon Corn-
munity Competition Policy—Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, which
provides for Community action in the case of the abuse of a dominant
position by a firm or group of firms. Community control on any other
basis would be contrary to Article 52,whichestablishes as Community
policy the expansion and encouragement of capital movements.'8
The French effort to raise their concern over increasing foreign
direct investment to the level of a Community problem requiring Corn-
munity action was thus a failure. The lack of response to this issue by
the other members can be attributed to the advantages each saw in con-
• "Speech by Prime Minister M. Pompidou, reported in the London Times,April25,
1963, p.18. See also statements by Minister of Finance Valery Giscard-d'Estaing
expressing similar sentiments, reported in the ChristianScience Monitor, February7,
1963, p. 4.
York Times, January 25, 1963, p. 13; March 25, 1963, p. 2; Christian Science
Monitor, February 7, 1963, p. 14.
European Community,April—May,1963, p. 9. See also D. Swann and D. L. Mc-
Lachian, Concentrationor Competition: A European Dilemma? London,1967, pp.
46ff., for an analysis of Article 86.
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tinuing American investment in its own economy; and, perhaps, in
some degree, to resentment at the way France had dealt unilaterally
with the question of British entry.19
Although French officials had indicated that their policy was to
protect vulnerable sectors, they did not specify what sectors these
were. The French response to the bid by General Electric to take over
Machines Bull revealed that the French electronic-computer industry
was among those considered vulnerable.20 An elaboration of French
policy was given by Finance Minister G.-d'Estaing at the end of 1964.
He stressed two points: that French industry required protection dur-
ing the transition period 1965 to 1970; and that in affording this pro-
tection, the government would make a distinction between foreign
take-overs of French firms, and investments which created new pro-
ductive facilities in France. The former were to be strictly controlled
during the transition period, while the latter would be permitted on
condition that they conformed to the objectives of French policy, par-
ticularly the National Plan.2'
During 1965, the French policy of discouraging American invest-
ment reached its apex. The philosophical basis was expounded by
President de Gaulle in his New Year's speech as he warned the French
people that great economic efforts would be required if they were to
avoid "being engulfed in painful mediocrity and...beingcolonized
by foreign interests, inventions and capability." 22 A few months later,
he made the same point even more clearly: "We must see that our ac-
tivities of the essential part remain under French management and
French control." 23 Although never officially acknowledged, it was
9It should be noted, however, that concern at the Community level had previously
been hinted at. The Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the
Community for the Second Stage, published in October, 1962, makes a brief reference
to foreign investment in the discussion of sector investment policy: "In certain special
cases foreign investments in the Community may raise special problems" (p. 59).
20 NewYorkTimes,February5,1964,p. 44. The negotiations involved a major re-
organization and division of the corporate structure. The defense-oriented work of the
firm was absorbed by a newly created and wholly French-owned corporation. For an
extensive treatment of the details of this affair, see Robert D. W. Landon Ii, "Franco-
e American Joint Ventures in France: Some Problems and Solutions," HarvardInter-
national LawJournal, Spring,1966, pp. 238—285.
21 Speech by Minister of Finance Giscard-d'Estaing, December 16, 1964.
22 "Nationalism and Cooperation," address given December 3 1, 1964.
23 "The Independence of France," address given April 27, 1965.408 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
widely reported that all applications for approval of new investments
were blocked—simply by not being acted upon.24
The effort to sponsor an EEC policy along French lines having
failed, during 1965 the French government carried out an extensive re-
view of its national policy toward foreign direct investment. Part of
this effort included the first official compilation and analysis of statistics
measuring, by sector, the magnitude of foreign direct investment in the
French economy. Until this time, the most detailed published statistics
were those collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce, but these
were limited to American capital only and the figures were not broken
down into sectors. The report,25 prepared by the Ministry of Industry,
introduced into the policy discussion facts as well as some analysis —
bothof which had heretofore been largely absent.
• The report noted both the macrodimensions of foreign investment
and its distribution by sectors. By the macromeasures, the scale of
American investment was acknowledged to be small—2.8 per cent of
• American productive investments abroad and only 1.7 per cent of the
French GNP. The main stress, however, was on the sector break-
down, where percentage of sales in 1963 was the measure of participa-
tion. The report's definition of sectors seemed at best capricious: the
list ranged from standard sectors, such as automobiles and agricultural
machinery, to hybrids such as razor blades and elevators. There is no
sense in which these latter two could reasonably be considered to be
of equal economic importance to the former pair. The classification
scheme appears to have been selected largely to achieve dramatic
effect by singling out classes of industry narrowly defined in such a
manner that the degree of American participation seems particularly
high.
The data and analysis notwithstanding, the conclusions of the re-
port were moderate and balanced, in contrast to many earlier official
evaluations of direct investment and its implications for France. The
report advised against a strict ban on foreign investment. It argued
24Itis ironic that the International Monetary Fund's AnnualReporton Exchange
Restrictions for 1964 had for the first time stated that foreigners were now freely per-
mitted to make direct investments in France (p. 176).
25Ministérede l'lndustrie, Rapport sur Les Investments Etrangers Dans Lindustries
Francaises (Bokanowski Report), 1965.INVESTMENT POLICY INU.K., FRANCE, AND GERMANY •409
that since the foreign firms could invest elsewhere within the EEC and
freely supply the French market, such a policy, although possible,
would leave French industry ultimately facing the same competition.
Furthermore, the French economy would lose the advantages of in-
vestment in France, such as balance-of-payments effects and the intro-
duction of new technology. This cost of French policy was pointed out
by other observers each time an applicant for French approval with-
drew and invested elsewhere in the EEC.
By the fall of 1965, the French had relaxed their ban on invest-
ment applications, although no take-overs were being approved.26
During this year there also developed more publicly expressed con-
cern within the Community institutions. Early in the year, President
Hallstein addressed himself to the question of American direct invest-
ment in an address given before a conference on "Europe, America,
and World Trade"; his concern, too, was "excessive sectorial concen-
tration of American investment."27 The Monetary Committee also ex-
pressed concern in its report issued in 1965.28 The committee, how-
ever, stressed the need to control inflation within the EEC. Capital
inflows, the report stated, made this control more difficult to achieve,
particularly when the inflows were direct investment and affected de-
mand directly.
Over-all, during the period 1963—65, we observe a shift in policy
from unrestricted approval of foreign investment to a careful screen-
ing of applications and a much more frequent rejection of requests. The
method of rejecting the applications was generally that of prolonged
delay in acting upon the applications. Both the method used for screen-
ing —administrati'iesecrecy —andpublic interpretations of the policy
reflect a lack of any consistent criteria except a strong, if not over-
riding, preference for investments creating new productive facilities
rather than take-overs of existing French-owned firms, and a special
concern for certain "key sectors."
Although a distinction between new capital investments and take-
overs is made so frequently that its significance seems always to be
New York Times(Internationaledition), September 17, 1965, p. 7; The Economist,
November 6, 1965, p. 633.
27 Address delivered in Amsterdam, February 4, 1965.
Seventh Report of the Monetary Committee (English edition), March, 1965, pp. 7ff.410 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
taken as self-evident, in fact it is not possible to differentiate clearly
between the economic effects of these two forms of investment. Both a
take-over bid and the direct creation of new capital have identical
initial balance-of-payments effects, and theory alone offers no guidance
regarding long-run balance-of-payments effects. The widely held view
that the one has "real" effects on the economy, while the other is
purely a financial transaction, is fallacious. The previous French
• owners of the firm that has been purchased will use the funds for con-
sumption, other domestic investment, or foreign investment. The mass
consumption of capital under the prevailing economic conditions seems
unreasonable as a general assumption; foreign investment does not
seem to have been a major concern during this period, as foreign-ex-
change controls were being relaxed; the form of new domestic invest-
• ment might, however, be a cause for official concern.
The French planning mechanism relies heavily upon the control
of credit to insure that domestic investment conforms to the plan. Thus,
it is possible that foreign take-overs could indirectly finance domestic
investment that credit institutions would discourage, e.g., land specula-
tion. Of the three possible explanations, this one is the most plausible,
although official emphasis has not been placed upon it to rationalize
the ban on take-overs.
The rationale that does seem implicit in the French attitude toward
foreign take-overs is that the remaining French firms in the industry
will be less able, or willing, to compete with the firms that have been
taken over than they would be had the foreign investment created a
• new firm. Although it is true that French firms would have more time
to adjust before feeling the competitive impact, this—when it does
occur—may well be stronger, due to the incorporation of the most
modern technology into a new plant.29 Alternatively, if the barriers to
• entry of new firms are very high in an industry, preventing take-overs
may effectively prohibit all foreign investment in that industry. Hence,
a ban on take-overs is a convenient device for banning all foreign in-
vestment.
29The banontake-overs may also be interpreted as one method of encouragingthe
• merger of French firms, in an effort to put them in a stronger competitive position
• the much larger American corporations. With the option of selling out to
foreign interests closed, merging with other firms may become the only alternative for
the financial survival of small firms.
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Let us turn now to the other major factor that appears to have
dominated French policy toward foreign direct investment during
the period under consideration: the desire to protect certain "key"
sectors from foreign investment. All references to key —oradvanced —
sectorsindicated that they were those in which the most rapid
technological change was taking place. The electronics industry
generally, and the computer branch specifically, is the example that
comes most readily to mind as the archetypal key sector in French
policy.
This key-sector criterion for screening applications for foreign
investments proved to be at least as inconsistent and unworkable as
the new versus take-over criterion. A recurring dilemma was created
as the policy of excluding investment in key sectors met head-on with
a policy of encouraging investments which introduced new technology,
simply because key sectors were most often those in which French
technology waslagging.Furthermore, foreign investors with a
technological advantage were obviously unwilling to invest unless they
could retain management control.3° L'affaire Bull presents an excel-
lent example of this latter conundrum: in this instance, French author-
ities opted to have the technology even at the expense of increased
foreign participation in a key sector.
B. Policy Under Finance Minister M. Debré, 1966—68
By 1966, it was clear that France lacked any viable long-run
policy, both because its membership in the EEC left the French
economy vulnerable to imports from American subsidiaries in other
member countries, and because the cost of developing French tech-
nology in all fields was too high.
The replacement of Valery Giscard-d'Estaing as Minister of
Finance by Michael Debré in January of 1966 initiated a reformulation
of French policy. The strident official commentary on the threats to
French independence posed by foreign investment ceased. Whereas
formerly one received the impression that foreign investment was
Evidencealso indicatesthat introduction of new technology through licensing agree-
ments would be no more acceptable to the French government than to the American
firms involved. This official concern over the purchase of foreign technology is reflected
in the fact that such agreements also required government approval.
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presumed to be harmful unless the merits of a particular case were es-
pecially strong, official statements now indicated that foreign invest-
ment was desirable unless the demerits of a particular case were
strong.31
Although explicit new criteria were not issued,32 the legal struc-
ture by which foreign investments were controlled was substantially
altered by a new law introduced in December of The new law
replaced the complex structure of foreign-exchange controls dating
from as far back as 1939. Although this new law was popularly pro-
claimed as a major step toward freedom of capital movements, in fact
it intensified the controls over direct foreign investment in the French
economy. New foreign investments still required approval by the
Finance Ministry although the Ministry could no longer block an appli-
cation by indefinite inaction. Two months after filing, applications were
to be considered automatically approved, unless the Ministry explicitly
disapproved the application or requested a postponement.
The scope of the investments subject to a declaration procedure
has, however, been substantially increased. For example, the transfer
of ownership of firms located in France from one foreign owner to an-
other requires approval. Similarly, the merger of two foreign firms
would require official approval if one of the merging firms owned a
French subsidiary, on the ground that the merger would change the
ownership of this subsidiary; existing foreign subsidiaries must now
obtain approval of the Finance Ministry to expand using new capital
from abroad—either equity or loans.
The law fails to provide a general definition of what constitutes a
controlling foreign interest in a French firm, except to exempt pur-
chases on the Bourse of less than 20 per cent of existing shares. Fur-
ther, other factors than percentage of ownership may be considered in
the definition. The Ministry of Finance lists these other factors as fol-
lows: loans or debt instruments held by the investor, real-property
rights, leases and mining rights, technical-assistance agreements, and
licensing of industrial-property rights.34
II London Times, January 31, 1966, p. 15.
12 International Financial News Survey, April 15, 1966, p. 120.
33The following summary of the legal aspects of the problem relies heavily upon the
excellent article by Torem and Craig, "Control of Foreign Investment in France,"
previously cited.
34ibid., p. 685.INVESTMENT POLICY IN U.K., FRANCE, AND GERMANY•413
A decree issued at the same time as the new regulations for for-
eign investments provides for government control of purchases by
French firms of foreign industrial-property rights and know-how. All
French firms must now obtain the approval of the Ministry of In-
dustry before acquiring foreign industrial-property rights, know-how,
or technical assistance. Further, if such acquisition is approved, annual
reports of expenses are required.
In summary, these new regulations provide a legal basis for ex-
ceedingly close control of all economic activity of foreigners in the
French economy—control which is actually more stringent than under
the previous structure of foreign-exchange controls. None of the
foreign investments mentioned earlier in this account of French policy
could have been made without explicit approval. For example, the
purchase of controlling interest in Simca by Chrysler was beyond
reach of the exchange controls because both parties were foreign. The
new law clearly brings such transactions under government control.
This law has, however, recently been seriously challenged by the
Commission of the European Economic Community. As was noted
above, French membership in the EEC legally subordinates French
policy to the provisions of the EEC treaty governing capital move-
ments; the Treaty of Rome and subsequent directives clearly establish
freedom of capital movements within the EEC—including direct in-
vestment. The Commission has notified the French government that
it considers the French authorization procedure for major foreign in-
vestments in France to be in violation of EEC regulations. The French
have replied that although authorization is required, it is automatic for
EEC companies, but this has not satisfied the Commission. Although
not explicitly raised, an important issue here is whether the European
subsidiaries of American firms are "European companies." To the
French, they are clearly not. This dispute will be resolved by the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, as the Commission has for-
mally charged that the French law governing capital movements is a
violation of the treaty.35
French policy continues to permit foreign investment on a selec-
tive basis, with a strong bias against foreign take-overs.36 There is also,
Wall Street Jouraal, February10,1969, p.12,and October 20, 1969, P. 12.
a Fora recentexample see The Economist, December 13, l969, p. 75..1
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however, some tangible evidence that other types of foreign invest-
ment are actively welcomed—at least in development regions. The
French government has again opened an office in New York to stim-
ulate the interest of foreign investors.37 Such an office existed previ-
ously but was closed in the early 1960's.
The viability of current French policy depends very much on the
outcome of the legal case brought by the European Commission, and
on the form and speed of the evolution of the EEC itself. We shall re-
turn to the implications of the latter in the section on comparative anal-
ysis.
THE GERMAN CASE
The German policy toward direct foreign investment has been ex-
ceptionally liberal, especially when contrasted with the policies of
France and Great Britain. This liberality has been evidenced both by
the complete lack of restrictions on such investment in Germany itself,
and by. the opposition of Germany, within the EEC, to French efforts
to create a Community-wide policy to control foreign investment. Fur-
ther evidence is to be found in the absence of any German law giving
the government legal power to prohibit direct foreign investment or to
require prior notification.38 The law does, however, require registra-
tion of the investment.39 The openness of the government policy ex-
tends to the regular publication of data on the magnitude and distribu-
tion of foreign participation in the German economy.4° It is the only
one of the three countries to do so. Because the policy has been so un-
restrictive, our discussion can be much more brief than it was in the
previous two cases.
Although German officials have not indulged in the strong implicit
and explicit criticism of foreign investment that has been evident in
Wall Street Journal, September11, 1965, p.1.
Admittedly,governments .of nations as large and modern as Germany do not, in
fact, need a legal base for preventing foreign investments. The mere expression of
government dissatisfaction with a proposed investment would normally be sufficient
to dissuade any foreign investor.
Verordnung zur Durchfuhrung des Aussenwirtschaftsgesetzes, paragraphs57and
58.
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France,there have been occasional expressions of concern.4' These,
however, have been moderate in tone, and have tended to stress the
economic rather than the political implications of excessive foreign
investment. In particular, such comments have drawn attention to the
possible reduction in competition that might be caused by highly con-
centrated industries, whether this concentration is foreign or domestic
or both.42
The official policy toward foreign investments was extensively out-
lined, in December, 1966, in a statement by the Minister of Economics,
Professor Schiller, responding to a question raised by a member of the
Bundestag. Professor Schiller stated that participation of foreign cap-
ital in the German economy does not have prejudicial effects; rather,
it strengthens the economy by stimulating competition and introducing
new ideas and techniques. The only problem that might arise, he stated,
would be due to concentrations that reached monopolistic levels. Al-
though he felt that no such concentrations then existed, the govern-
ment was closely observing key industries such as oiL43
The only publicly reported instances of government intervention
to prevent a foreign take-over involved the oil industry. Early in 1966,
a bid was made by the Texas Oil Company for a controlling interest in
the ailing firm Deutsche-Erdöl. Negotiations were broken off, owing
to government opposition. However, for reasons not known, the gov-
ernment soon withdrew its objections, and the transfer of ownership
was ultimately accomplished.44
A similar situation arose again in the oil industry when the Dresd-
ner bank sought to find a buyer for its 30 per cent share in one of the
only three remaining German-owned oil firms, Gelsenkirchner Ber-
gewerk (GBAG). Both American and French firms were said to be in-
It should, perhaps, be added that Germans not holding official government positions
have been rather more apt to criticize the Government's liberal policy toward direct
foreign investment. See, for example, "The New American Invasion of Germany,"
DerSpiegel. October,1965;andthe remarks of a key member of the German Parlia-
ment, reported in the WallStreet Journal, April6,1966,p. 5.
42See "Foreign Investments in Germany," a statement by Government Director
Waldemar Muellar-Enders, Federal Ministry of Economics, in the Bulletinof the Fed-
eral Press Office, August26, 1966.
Drucksache, vf 1249 of December 19, 1966.
Wall Street Journal,May 2, 1966, p. 5;andMay 13, 1966, p. 32; The Economist,
May14, 1966. p. 743.I
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terested. However, the German government actively sought a German
buyer and succeeded in finding one. GBAG was finally taken over by
Germany's largest electrical producer.45
The German government's sensitivity to foreign investment in the
domestic oil industry reflects considerably more than a fear of eco-
nomic concentration per Se. First, it is not clear that concentration in
the German market would have been increased by any of the proposed
foreign purchases. Secondly, any definition of the relevant market
should start at the level of the EEC and then be limited as other eco-
nomic factors suggest. To start with, the German market—particularly
to the exclusion of French purchasers —indicatesthat nationalist sen-
timents, although less of a factor in German policy, are nevertheless
not completely absent. We shall return to some implications of German




It is of some interest to review the quantitative changes in foreign
investment in the three countries during the postwar period. To the
extent that policies have differed significantly among them, these dif-
ferences should be reflected in the data for this era. We shall restrict
our attention to the period 1958 to 1968; 1958 provides a natural start-
ing point because the European Economic Community formally came
into existence in that year, and because there was a significant move
toward greater convertibility of European currencies at this time. Both
factors represent important structural changes affecting foreign invest-
ment, and differentiate these years from the earlier postwar period.
Our attention will be restricted to flows from the United States to
Europe, to the six countries of the European Economic Community,
The Economist, August 12, 1967, p. 595; June 17, 1967, p. 1264; October 5, 1968,
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andto each of the three countries selected for this study. The reasons
for this restriction are the availability of comparable data, the over-
riding importance of American investment, and the obvious economic
homogeneity of Europe, as contrasted with other areas of the world.
Further, we are only concerned with relative shifts in the flow of Amer-
ican investment to these parts of Europe.
Adopting these restrictions, the available data have been assembled
into two tables. Table 1 gives the annual net capital outflow from the
United States and Table 2 records the book value of American invest-
ment abroad at the end of each year.
The general statistical picture that emerges from these two'1es
is well known: the flow of American investment to Europe inced
quite rapidly early in this period but declined at the end of it as J.S.
controls over direct investment in Europe came into effect. There was,
nevertheless, more than a fourfold increase in the book value of Amer-
ican investments in Europe in this ten-year period.
The data on book values are of interest primarily because they
provide historical perspective. These data reflect both the relative at-
tractiveness of countries for American investors over long periods and
the residual effects of major upheavals in the international economy,
such as wars.
Within Europe, the United Kingdom and the countries of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community combined accounted for 89 per cent of
all American investments in 1958, and 81 per cent in 1968. The de-
cline notwithstanding, the two areas have clearly dominated the Eu-
ropean picture both historically and over this recent period. Among
individual nations, the United Kingdom similarly dominates with 47
per cent of all American investments in Europe in 1958, and 35 per
cent in 1968. This dominance reflects the historical preferences of
American investors for Britain, although, since 1958, the creation of
the EEC has tended to alter this pattern. In 1957, the British share was
48 per cent, as compared with the 40 per cent share of the EEC coun-
tries; by 1968 these shares had changed to 35 percent and 46 percent.
Although the book values are arrived at over this period as a cu-
mulation of net flows, the flows are also of interest because they quickly
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able effects in the stock figures only over longer periods of time. Be-
cause of the sharp changes in French policy during this period, the
flows relating to France are of particular interest.
In 1958, the flows of American investment to Germany and France
were approximately equal, each representing about 36 per cent of
American investment in the countries of the Community. In combina-
tion, they represented only slightly less than American investment
going to England. For the remainder of the period, Germany's share
of foreign investment in the Community was significantly larger than
the French share. In 1968, Germany received half of all American in-
vestment in the Community, while the French share was zero. The
impact of the more restrictive policy is clearly seen in the steady de-
cline of France's share of American investment in the countries of the
Community after 1963. The precipitous drop from 1967 to 1968 was,
however, no doubt attributable to the civil disorders in 1968.
The data for the United Kingdom are complicated by several large
individual investments, especially Ford's purchase of the minority in-
terest in British Ford in 1960, and Chrysler's final purchase of Rootes
Motors in 1965. Making an allowance for these, from 1958 to 1961 the
flow into the United Kingdom was approximately 80 per cent of the
flow to the Community, although this flow exceeded the combined flow
to Germany and France. In 1962, the flow into the United Kingdom
relative to that into the Community declined abruptly and then, through
1967, remained constantly in the range of 40 per cent to 50 per cent
of American investment in the Community. During this same period,
American investment in France and Germany combined was in the
range of 60 per cent to 70 per cent of the investment in the Community,
with the share going to Germany steadily increasing over that going to
France. By 1 966—67, Germany and the United Kingdom were receiv-
ing equal amounts.
The data for 1968 are substantially at variance with the trends es-
tablished during the previous five years. The jump in investment in
Britain relative to that in the Community reflects the impact of three
major events: the complete cessation of further investment in France
(resulting in part from French domestic political instability); the de-
valuation of the pound in the fall of 1967 (making assets in the United
Kingdom cheaper); and, finally, political uncertainties aroused by the
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invasion of Czechoslovakia. One can only conjecture as to the relative
weights that should be assigned to each of these happenings.
In spite of the difficulties in accurately assessing causes of the
1968 data, the impact of French policy is still clear: no other explana-
tion adequately explains the intra-Community shifts of American in-
vestment away from France. During this same time, American in-
vestment in the Community as a whole did not show any decline relative
to American investment in Europe. From 1962 to 1967, the Com-
munity's share of all American investment in Europe has remained very
stable at around 50 per cent.
This brief analysis of the data indicates that French policy has
been both too effective (with respect to discouraging American invest-
ments in France) and quite ineffective (not achieving any significant
reduction in American investment in the Community). French policy
has only redirected American investment from France to the other
countries of the Community—especially Germany.
ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS
In this section we consider in turn those economic variables which
have appeared most frequently in the discussions of foreign investment
policy, our objective being to evaluate their actual importance in the
decision-making of each of the three countries. In the subsequent sec-
tion we shall consider those variables that could be classified as eco-
nomic but which, we feel, have in actuality been shaped more by po-
litical considerations.
A. Balance of Payments
During the whole postwar period, the balance of payments has
been a major factor in the economic policy of the United Kingdom, and
certainly, as we have noted, any official discussion of foreign invest-
ment always mentions the favorable balance-of-payments effects.
Nevertheless, it seems extremely unlikely that the weak balance of
payments was a crucial determinant of the generally unrestrictive
United Kingdom policy; rather, it served primarily to rationalize it.
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be "solved," this would be more likely to lead to a removal of govern-
ment restrictions on foreign investment by British firms than to the
adoption of a more restrictive policy toward foreign investment in the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is too important a foreign in-
vestor itself to risk an overtly restrictive policy.
In Germany, the balance of payments was typically in surplus over
this period, frequently combined with problems of inflation. Restriction
of foreign direct investment would have assisted in ameliorating both
of these problems. Nevertheless, no restrictions were imposed or
mooted in public.
Early in the period, France was experiencing balance-of-payments
deficits, and the liberal foreign-investment policy of this time encour-
aged capital inflows, which assisted in the financing of these deficits.
In the mid-1960's, when foreign-investment policy became highly re-
strictive, French reserves were rising, thus permitting the balance-of-
payments impact of this reversal of policy to be ignored. Subsequently,
the balance of payments returned to a deficit. Nevertheless, there has
been no return to the earlier liberal policy. Foreign investments that
would involve the take-over of French firms are still discouraged.
On the basis of these three different situations, we conclude that
the balance of payments has generally played a peripheral rather
than an overriding one, in determining policy toward foreign direct in-
vestment.
B. Economic Planning
The literature makes frequent reference to the complications
created for national economic planning by direct foreign investment in
Europe. Usually such references take the complications as self-evident;
hence, no supporting evidence is offered. Here, we shall critically re-
view the potential importance of these complications for the countries
in our study. Of these three, only two are of interest in this respect,
Germany having no significant, detailed national economic planning.
The United Kingdom and France do have forms of economic planning,
although implementation of the British plan has not been vigorously
pursued. We shall discuss each in turn.
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beyond the scope of this paper.46 We are primarily interested in po-
tential and actual conflicts between planning goals, the means for
achieving them, and foreign participation in the British economy. With
this in mind, it is interesting to observe the role and the problems that
the planners themselves anticipated. The basic document for the British
effort at detailed planning was issued in 1965, a time of manifest con-
cern over foreign investment.47 Although this document runs to over
four hundred pages, there is only one significant reference to foreign
investment:
New productive investment by foreign companies, especially
in underemployed areas of the United Kingdom, will continue to
play an important part in the creation of new industrial capacity.
A special effort will be made to attract those companies whose ex-
ports to Britain have already secured them a firm base in the British
market to start local production. There will continue, of course, to
be regulation of the acquisition of control of existing British com-
panies.48
Taken at face value, this statement indicates that conflicts between
economic planning and foreign direct investment are not at issue. Fur-
ther, in the regional planning of the United Kingdom, the significant
role played by American investment is well recognized. If planning
encompasses the alteration of the structure of industries, both to create
larger production units and to preserve a substantial degree of domestic
ownership, then the potential for conflict is significant. As we noted
earlier, British policy regarding the structure of industry places con-
siderable emphasis on protecting domestic ownership.
In France, the planning issue is more complex than in Britain,
because it has been an important guiding force in the French economy
during the whole postwar period;it is an integral part of the economic
46 Fora thorough discussion of the development of United Kingdom.planning, see
Everett E. Hagen and Stephanie F. T. White, Great Britain: Quiet Revolution in
Planning, Syracuse, N.Y.,1966.For a comparative analysis of planning among the
countries of interest here, see M. MacLennon, M. Forsyth, and G. Denton, Economic
Planningand Policiesin Britain,France, and Ge,',nany, NewYork. 1968.
The NationalPlan, Cmd. 2764, London, 1965.
48Ibid.,p. 10.
49See MacLennon et a!. for a brief review and analysis of French planning:424 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
fabric of the nation. Further, the plan is much more detailed in that out-
put targets are set for individual industries rather than just for macro-
variables. For implementation, the plan relies upon both government
intervention and an économie concertée achieved through cooperation
between industry and government. Government intervention takes
place through both fiscal and monetary incentives —particularlythe
latter. Extensive government control of the capital market and major
• credit institutions is a basic factor in insuring compliance with the plan.
With this institutional structure of planning in the French econ-
omy, one can readily see that a large disruptive influence might be
wielded by foreign-controlled firms.5° Such firms can be expected
neither to identify with the plan as a national goal nor to depend as
much upon French credit sources as do French-owned firms. This
• point has been frequently reflected in the public criticism of foreign
investment. The closures of the plants of Remington Rand and Frig-
idaire cited earlier gave credence to the alleged indifference of Ameri-
can firms to accepted modes of French socioeconomic behavior.
Because of this widely accepted presumption that direct invest-
ment has been incompatible with the French planning mechanism, the
statement of Oliver Giscard-d'Estaing before a Congressional com-
mittee is of particular interest. In listing the significance of American
investment for the French economy, he stated that subsidiaries of
American firms have been responsive to French economic-planning
policies.51 The major concern expressed by Oliver Giscard-d'Estaing
related to the technology gap and American investments. We shall
return to this issue below.
Another factor that reduces the disruptive potential of foreign in-
vestments for French planning is the wide power for regulating this
• investment embodied in the law passed in 1967. This piece of legisla-
tion effectively prevents foreign firms from escaping French credit
these gaps. Nevertheless, the report suggests that member countries
MacLennoner a!., p. 362.
International Aspects of Anti-trust, Part 1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust andMonopoly ofthe Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress,
2ndSession,April 28,1966, p. 205. M. OliverGiscard-d'Estaing should not be confused
with his brother Valery, who was Minister of Finance just prior to this time. At the time
of his testimony, Oliver Giscard-d'Estaing was Director General of the European
Institute for Business Administration, Fontainebleu, France. He has also achieved the
rank of Inspector of Finance within the French Civil Service.INVESTMENT POLICY IN U.K., FRANCE, AND GERMANY •425
controlsthrough borrowing abroad. The law, however, does not re-
strict self-financing of these firms through retained earnings. This stand
is consistent with a move toward more flexible planning; the Fifth Plan,
in fact, encourages more self-financing by firms, in spite of the loss of
government influence which results.52
To summarize, the complications created for French planning by
foreign direct investment seem, upon examination, to have been more
potential than actual. Further, as French membership in the European
Economy Community increases French interdependence with the
other member economies, the implications for French national planning
raised by this new situation will greatly overshadow any complications
caused by American investments.
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS AND THE TECHNOLOGY GAP
Our review of the economic determinants has failed to suggest any
general framework which builds upon them to explain the policy ac-
tions described earlier. In fact, our analysis has suggested that, collec-
tively, these strictly economic factors have played at most a minor role.
In this section, we seek a better understanding of these policies by
taking a broader view—one that encompasses the political context.
Since the mid-1960's, one of the major topics dominating the dis-
cussion of American-European relationships has been the "technology
gap."Concern over this problem has been widespread in Europe,
and it has placed American direct investment and technology in a dif-
ferent perspective. The policymaker's view of the interrelationship
between transfer of technology and foreign direct investment has
undergone a radical change during the postwar period. The earlier
view (frequently reflected in the policy statements reviewed above)
52MacLennonetaL, p. 167.
Most of this discussion has been distressingly vague—a term searching for a phe-
nomenon, and frequently not even finding a definition. The important parts of this dis-
cussion have now been masterfully pulled together and given a clear framework by
Robert Gilpin in his book Francein the Age of the Scientific State, Princeton,N.J.,
1968. Much of the discussion which follows here draws directly on his basic concep-
tualization. Anyone interested in the literature should refer to his book; the subsequently
published OECD reports in TheGaps in Technology Between Member Countries
series;and Christopher Layton, EuropeanAdvanced Technology: A Programme for
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was an extremely positive one: the benefits to the domestic economy
of new technology were unquestioned, and foreign investment was a
uniquely important device for transmitting this technology.
By the mid-1960's, a significant counterview began to emerge in
the context of a broader reassessment of science and technology, and
their implications for the evolution of the nation-state. This view has
been articulated most extensively by the French; it is, however, by no
means an exclusively French concern.54
Robert Gilpin has recently synthesized the French views and gen-
eralized them into a most useful and interesting conceptual framework.
In Gilpin's view, this new and overriding concern over technology on
the part of European political leaders marks the beginning of the age of
the "Scientific State" and the end of the "Industrial State." From the
19th century to the mid-2Oth century, industrialization was the step
through which a nation-state could achieve the status of a Great
Power.55 Even the rhetoric of the 1950's reflects this: size and growth
of GNP, amount of steel capacity, and so on, were the indices of Great
Power status. But in the age of the Scientific State, the institutionaliza-
tion of science and technology provides nations with the essential in-
gredient for Great Power status, as it is now conceived.56
Similar ideas appear in the study by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development on Gaps in Technology, but
without Gilpin's conceptual framework. After reviewing the evidence,
the OECD report concludes that technological gaps have had no un-
desirable effectsonthe tradeor on the economic growth (paramount
goals in the age of the Industrial State) of the countries experiencing
these gaps. Nevertheless, the report suggests that member countries
See,for example, the famous "industrial helotry" speech by Harold Wilson, de-
livered to the Council of Europe on January 23, 1967. See also earlier remarks on a
European Technological Community, London Times, November 15, 1966, p.1, and
December 1, 1966, p. 12.
Gilpin, op. cit., p. 5.
56ibid.,p. 25. J.-J. Servan-Schreiber is also concerned with achieving Great Power
status for Europe through technology. This idea is clearly stated in his influential book
The AmericanChallenge, althoughit is buried in a footnote on page Ill of the English
edition. In explaining why selective specialization in industries, on the
Swedish model, will not do, he states, "The Swedish model is rich in social potential,
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desireto control their own technology.57 Great Power aspirations re-
• quire far greater national control over science and technology than is
possible if foreign firms dominate the domestic science-based in-
dustries.
• If this thesis is correct, the differences in the policies toward
American investment demonstrated by the three countries reflect dif-
ferences in the gaps dividing the Great Power aspirations and the re-
sources of each. This gap has been greatest for France and relatively
smaller in the cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, although
not altogether insignificant in either.
The United Kingdom has both a broader base in the technologi-
cally advanced industries and an easier entree to American technology
in certain fields, most notably that of atomic development.58 Germany
has also had a special political relationship with the United States
because of its defense problems; this relationship has negated any
technological independence.59
In spite of these differences, an independent European technology
and science has emerged as a common concern, with implications that
may ultimately lead to a common policy toward foreign direct invest-
ment. As was noted earlier, France failed in 1963 to obtain support
from other members of the European Economic Community in es-
tablishing a Community-level policy to control American investment.
By 1965, however, the other European countries were moving much
closer to the French view of the importance of science and technology —
andthe attendant need for action. We shall return to the implications
for Community policy in the next section.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
No discussion of the policies of France and Germany would be
complete without reference to their membership in the European
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Gapsin Technology:
Genera/Report Paris,1968, p. 31.
Gilpin, op.cit., p.54.
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Economic Community, both because economic interdependence im-
poses constraints on the national policies of any member, and because
the Community has the long-range goal of harmonizing all national
economic policies. However, insofar as a firm policy of the Community
is still being formulated, we can do little more than suggest which lines
of development appear to be the most significant for the future.
On the Community level, it seems unlikely that any policy explic-
itly restricting American investment will be adopted. This approach,
though urged by France, has never received public support from other
members. However, the French have stimulated common concerns
which are now receiving Community attention in two distinct ways.
First, concern for European technology has led to numerous
national cooperative efforts (e.g., the Concorde) and to some efforts on
the Community level (e.g., Euratom), but no comprehensive frame-
work has yet emerged, nor is it yet clear what types of cooperation are
most successful. The obstacles have been extensively analyzed and
numerous proposals advanced, but nationalistic sentiments and ri-
vairies have continued to prevent a comprehensive approach.6°
The second policy of the Community that is evolving deals with
nationalizing the industrial structure—a response similar to that
taken by the United Kingdom in creating the Industrial Reorganization
Corporation.6' The Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee of the
Community is formulating a policy concerning the industrial structure
which aims to improve the competitiveness of firms in the countries of
the Community vis-à-vis American firms, especially those with large
investments in Community countries.62
One of the goals of the industrial-structure policy is to create
larger European firms on a scale comparable to the major international
firms.63 To carry out such a policy at the Community level is an under-
taking vastly more difficult than doing so within a single nation. Many
other Community policies must be formulated and implemented si-
Both GilpinandLayton (1969) provide comprehensive analyses of these problems.
Layton also provides an extensive review of the specific efforts at technological cooper-
ation that have been undertaken.
European Communities, SecondGeneral Report ontheActivities ofthe Communi-
ties(1968), Brussels, February, 1969, p. 199.
62 European Economic Community Commission, Tenth General Report on the Ac-
tivities of the Community. Brussels, June, 1967, p. 179.
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multaneously to permit modification of the industrial structure; these
• include a European company law, a detailed Community antitrust
policy, a more efficient Continental capital market, and a decision on
the admission of new members to the
These are, of course, major obstacles to the evolution of the Corn-
munity itself, and complete discussion of them is beyond our limits
here. If these obstacles are surmounted, a policy of the Community
regarding its industrial structure could have a most significant impact
on foreign direct investment. If this policy is implemented by discrimi-
nation against existing foreign firms —throughdiscriminatory govern-
ment purchasing, for example —thepostwar trend away from economic
nationalism could well be reversed.65
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
OUR "Review of Policies" has shown none of the three countries will-
ing to permit complete freedom of foreign direct investment in its
economy, international agreements to this effect notwithstanding. The
methods of restricting foreign investment have been quite different
among the three. The English have abided by the letter of the agree-
ments but have also undertaken domestic policies clearly designed as
defensive measures aimed at preventing foreign investment in certain
industries. The French were initially less subtle in their methods for
restricting investment. Apparently, the restrictions were carried to
excess, necessitating the subsequent revision of policy. With the single
exception of oil, German policy has been highly unrestrictive. This
policy will be tested in the future by the support and direction that
Germany gives to the developing policy of the European Economic
Community.
64 European Communities, First General Report on the Activities of the Communities
(1967), Brussels, February, 1968, pp. 193—194. Many of these points are also de-
veloped by E. M. J. A. Sassen, a member of the Commission, in his article, "Competition
Policy: More than 'Anti' Trust," European Community, 1969, pp. 3—5.
the view of Commission member M. Guido Colonna di Paliano in "Industrial
Policy: Problems and Outlook," Bulletin of the European Communities, February,
5—8.'I
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One important question raised by our study concerns the real
motivation behind restrictive policies. The "Comparative Analysis"
section above failed to uncover any official economic rationale solidly
based on factual and theoretical economic analysis. On the contrary,
• the official rationale was typically devoid of factual evidence and of
any solid base of sound economic theory. The general policy bias
against foreign take-overs as opposed to "real" investment is a major
example of bad theorizing.66
For an explanation, one is tempted to attribute restrictive policies
to simple economic nationalism. Such an explanation now has a secure
place in the corpus of economic theory, asaresult of the work of Breton
and Johnson.67 Their approach suggests that domestic ownership of
economic assets within a country is a collective, or public, good from
which psychic income is derived by the populace or significant seg-
meats of it. Restriction of foreign direct investment can thus be in-
terpreted as rational economic behavior. While this approach has gen-
• eral appeal, it seems inadequate for the cases at hand, because it does
not adequately emphasize the increasing focus of these restrictive
policies on the science-based industries.
The concept of the Scientific State may provide a more insightful
and richer explanation. It is more insightful through its particular
relevance to the three countries under discussion, given their state of
economic development and their historical experience. It is also a
richer explanation because it simultaneously encompasses other im-
portant contemporary phenomena peculiar to these countries—for
example, their national concern with science and educational policy,
and the interrelationships of these with foreign direct investment.68
Because of the growing common elements in these three national
66 One might argue that new foreign firms are preferable to take-overs because a larger
• number of firms will reduce industrial concentration and increase competition. This,
however, would be empirically inappropriate here, inasmuch as all three governments
have generally been concerned to increaseconcentrationof the domestically owned
firms.
61 Albert Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism," Journal of Political Economy,
72 (1964), pp. 376—386. H. G. Johnson, "A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism
in New and Developing States," Political Science Quarterly, 80 (June, 1965), pp. 169—
185.
68 H. G. Johnson, Comparative Cost and Commercial Policy Theory for a Developing
World Economy. Wicksell Lectures, 1968; Stockholm, 1968. See especially the second
lecture.
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policies, and because of the overwhelming likelihood that Britain will
join the European Economic Community, attention naturally turns to
the Community for the future implications of these policies.
A major implication for the future is the Community's policy re-
garding its industrial structure. If this policy moves to create Euro-
pean firms in science-based industries through overtly discriminatory
and protectionist devices, it will have undesirable consequences for
free trade in the Atlantic Community and for the economic benefits
derived from this trade —notto mention the political friction that it
would generate.
It nevertheless seems likely that, by some means, larger European
firms are going to be created. Two major economic issues for the future
then follow. The first of these will be a need to arrive at an international
agreement defining and limiting the scope for discriminatory govern-
mental "Buy American" or "Buy European" policies. Policies of this
nature already represent substantial barriers to efficient resource allo-
cation on the international level, and if unchecked, promise to raise
even greater obstacles in the future. Further, as two-way direct invest-
ment grows, it will become more and more difficult to make ethnoeco-
nomic distinctions.
A second consideration for the future lies in the fact that a greater
numberof large European firms will mean a greater number of large
multinational firms. The world is a big market, but economic concen-
tration can threaten competition in this market just as it can in national
markets. To avoid this, there will be a growing need for internationally
• agreed upon and enforced "competition policy."
Both of these issues will require the attention of economists. The
threat of economic nationalism is still with us, but it now appears with
a new impetus and a new rationale in the age of the Scientific State.
The Scientific State, like the Industrial State before it, has a tre-
mendous potential for benefiting mankind through the systematic
application of new scientific knowledge according to comparative
advantage. But this potential may well be lost if the Scientific State
reverts to the narrowly nationalistic pattern that characterized.the early
development of the Industrial State.432 •INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
COMMENTS
MERLE YAHR WEISS
NATIONALBUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Although the title of Severn's paper, "Investment and Financial
Behavior of American Direct Investors in Manufacturing," is a fairly
accurate description of the content of his paper, his intention in
analyzing the behavior of foreign investors is to appraise the impact
of American direct investment on certain items in the balance of pay-
ments of the United States. By his methods, he finds that domestic
economic circumstances and policies have negligible effects on direct-
investment outflows. This conclusion is warranted on the basis of his
analysis, but his work cannot be used to estimate the over-all effect of
direct investment on the balance of payments.
Other than capital outflows and remitted earnings, Severn's paper
ignores all effects of direct investment on the balance of payments.
There is no reason to believe that the secondary effects of direct in-
vestment—for example, multiplier effects on income in the host
country, changes in the demand by subsidiaries for capital goods pro-
duced in the United States, the substitution of goods produced by
subsidiaries for exports from the United States, changes in the de-
mand for parts and components imported from the United States, and
even changes in exports to the United States of goods produced by
subsidiaries—are negligible, or that their net effect on the balance of
payments is very small. In addition, subsidiaries might provide infor-
mation about other American products not produced by subsidiaries,
and by this means increase exports from the United States. Although,
at present, we do not know the magnitudes of these effects, I feel that
Severn's approach to the appraisal of the impact of direct foreign in-
vestment on the balance of payments is incomplete and, moreover,
addresses itself to analyzing an aspect of foreign direct investment that
could have but little effect on the balance of payments.
Certainly the view of the U.S. government in changing the volun-
tary controls on direct investment to mandatory controls was that p0-
tential future inflows could be sacrificed to reduce present outflows.COMMENT BY WEISS•433
Wedo not know whether the government view has been warranted,
butSevern'sanalysis cannot yield the information we need to appraise
the costs of the government's action.
Severn's paper is divided into two parts: in the first, he estimates a
model of investment and financial behavior of multinational firms. His
intention here is to assess the importance of various factors within an
individual firm as determinants of the firm's division of expenditures
between foreign and domestic investment. Because he views payments
of dividends to stockholders as competing with other possible uses of
the firm's funds, he also estimates the determinants of variations in
dividends. In yet another equation, he estimates the determinants of
the relative allocation of firm funds between domestic and foreign
uses.
Severn's main interest is in determining whether firms will use
their internally generated funds for domestic, or for foreign, investment
expenditures. Correctly, he views the firm's managers as dividing their
investment funds between foreign and domestic uses, depending on
where the marginal efficiency of investment is higher. However, his
proxy variable for the marginal efficiency of investment is the change in
the firm's sales in each location. Changes in sales represent, at most,
only the changes in the demand factors that the firm faces in each loca-
tion, totally ignoring the cost conditions which, together with the de-
mand conditions faced by the firm, determine the marginal efficiency of
investment. These cost conditions are unlikely to remain constant dur-
ing the annual periods which Severn takes as his short run. Possibly,
one could argue that cost conditions are relatively homogeneous within
the United States and that change in sales is a good proxy for the
marginal efficiency of investment in different locations. Among coun-
tries, though, a large body of statistics indicates that costs of produc-
tion, including wages and the prices of raw materials, differ greatly.
Furthermore, because of the unavailability of certain specialized fac-
tors of production in some countries, production of certain products
may be impossible. Is it reasonable to assume, then, that the marginal
efficiency of investment can be measured by sales changes alone, or by
adding lagged sales changes to the model to take account of more long-
run effects? I think not. Furthermore, Severn's model assumes that the
firm's output is sold in eithertheforeign or the domestic market ex-r 434 •INTERNATIONAL MOBiLiTY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
clusively,and that output produced in a given area is sold in thatarea.
Exports are not a part of his model, and their omissionappears to be
inconsistent with the view that firms maximize worldwide profits.
In the second part of his paper, within the context of his model of
behavior of the firm, Severn uses the results of his estimating tech-
niques to measure the impact of macroeconomic policyon the balance
of payments of the United States. He finds that domestic economic
policy has a negligible net effect on direct-investment outflows. Are-
cession in the United States causes a large decrease in net outflows
during the recession year and an increase in the nextyear. His results
are not surprising: multinational firms undertake investment in order
to maximize long-run worldwide profits.If a recession limits the
ability of these firms to finance foreign investments, they will either
increase their capital outflows in the following yearor will attempt to
finance their foreign expansion by borrowing abroad. This latter action
is entirely ignored in Severn's model, and almost entirely ignored in
his paper. Does not the maximization of worldwide profits of the firm
imply that firms will utilize foreign borrowingas a source of funds if
they are cheaper or, as in the case of the present restrictionson capital
outflows, if they are sometimes the onlymeans by which multinational
firms can expand abroad.
Severn's data cover the period 1961—66. The voluntaryrestraint
program was begun in 1965 and was extended in 1966. Thus, during
two years of this six-year period, the U.S. governmentwas urging
firms to finance any expansion of their productivecapacity abroad by
foreign borrowing. Firms not only had a rational basis for borrowing
abroad when it was cheaper for them to doso, but, in 1965 and 1966,
they had fewer choices and were often forcedto expand their foreign
capacity by this means.
In one version of his model, Severn does includea dummy
variable for 1966. This variable takesa positive sign, but it is not
significant. The positive sign implies that foreign-investmentexpendi-
Lures increased in response to the restraint program. Although the
positive coefficient could, be attributed toerrors in the data, Severn
believes that it is indicative of the actual behavior of firms,reported in
their annual reports (the source of his data), theseerrant firms success-
fully concealing their behavior from the U.S.government. An article in
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theWall Street Journal suggested that part of the errors-and-omis-
sions item in the balance of payments represented capital exports by
American firms. This appears to be possible. However, I doubt that
these same firms would then reveal large capital exports in their an-
nual reports to their stockholders.
At present, we have very little empirical information about the
determinants of foreign investment. Severn has attempted to fill this
gap in our knowledge by developing and estimating a model of the
international firm's investment behavior. His paper provides a useful
beginning. After reading it, other authors will be better able to under-
stand the international firm. However, I submit that much additional
work needs to be done before we shall be able to estimate the balance-
of-payments effects of foreign investment.
Gillespie examines the policies of three important host countries
of American foreign investment, namely, England, France and Ger-
many, to obtain an understanding of the economic determinants of
these countries' policies toward foreign investment. His objective is a
valuable one: if we knew the economic conditions that determined
policy, we would be better equipped to predict policy changes and to
appraise the appropriateness of specific policies.
The main body of his paper is a review of the policies of England,
France and Germany toward direct foreign investment during the post-
World War II period. He cites the laws regulating foreign investment
in each of these countries and briefly recounts how they were inter-
preted for specific American foreign investments that provoked public
debate and controversy. Gillespie is aware that this approach leads
him to ignore many potential investments that were immediately re-
jected and others that were not undertaken because the American in-
vestor withdrew his request in anticipation of its being rejected.
However, Gillespie is not aware that his approach also fails to analyze
the total investment climate in any of these countries resulting from
the existence of rules and regulations which restrict the activities of
foreign investors. We do not know how many American firms did not
request the privilege of investing in England, France, or Germany be-
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Gillespie compares the quantitative changes in foreign invest-
ment in the three countries during the 1958—68 period. He believes
that the policies of each of these countries should have determined, to
some degree, the capital flows received by each country during this
period. Undoubtedly this is true; however, American firms should
also have responded to other conditions prevailing in these countries
before undertaking foreign investments—considering primarily their
incentive to maximize worldwide profits. We cannot tell from these
data what factors motivate American firms to invest in each of these
countries, and the relative strength of these factors.
However, Gillespie's principal concern is not with why investment
takes place but with the economic determinants of host-country
policies toward foreign investment. He concludes that economic con-
ditions,specificallybalance-of-payments• problemsandinternal
economic planning, have had only a minor role in determining the
policies toward foreign investment of these three countries. Although
this is a possible conclusion based upon the experience in the coun-
tries under discussion, it does not convince me. He reasons that since
Britain is a significant foreign investor herself, she will never use
balance-of-payments conditions as a basis for restricting foreign invest-
ment. This conclusion implies that Britain will not restrict foreign-
investment activities, as she will always be conscious of her own role
as a foreign investor.
Although national economic planning could provide a basis for re-
stricting foreign investment, Gillespie concludes that this factor did
not motivate France, the principal planning nation of the three, to limit
foreign investment. Britain, which has a somewhat less planned
economy than France, did not find that foreign investors had goals that
were inconsistent with the British planning goals. In short, neither
balance-of-payments problems nor economic-planning goals motivated
Britain, France, or Germany to regulate foreign investment.
What, then, provided the incentive for regulations? Gillespie cites
nationalism as the principal factor. In his view, these three countries
and the European Economic Community are very much concerned
with developing their own large firms, which will successfully compete
with the already significant and large American firms. If this is correct
and the Europeans are successful, American firms can expect moreCOMMENT BY SAMETZ • 437
•- competitionfrom European producers and greater restrictions on their
• expansion in Europe. American firms would do well to study Gilles-
pie's conclusions and appraise their impact on company activities.
r ARNOLD W. SAMETZ
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Severn's study is essentially an extension to foreign direct invest-
ment of a theory of corporate investment decision-making that has been
• applied to domestic investment. By treating the international firm's
•
I decision in a noncompartmentalized way, he has been able to develop
a testable model of the financial behavior of direct investors abroad
that is analytically appealing and that promises to predict well. I think
•
. weare going to see much more work following the lines set out in this
paper; and a reevaluation of other approaches is in order.
On the one hand, the variety of residual-fund theories that relate
•
• foreigninvestment too closely to the earnings of foreign subsidiaries,
• or even treat those earnings as wholly reserved for foreign investment,
are refuted. Indeed, earnings of the foreign subsidiary seem to have
more effect on domestic investment of the firm, and on investment of
• the firm as a whole. There seems to be even less reluctance to go out-
side for funds to finance investment opportunities abroad than for those
•: at home.
On the other hand, the usual approach of companng the marginal
efficiency of investment (MEL) with the cost of funds, as applied to
cyclical expansion, would seem to be supported by Severn's findings.
For example, considering that, over the period covered, the invest-
ment boom was abroad rather than at home, and given a Lintner divi-
derid function, the share of external finance of subsidiaries both from
the parent and from local sources abroad increases. (Sources-of-funds
data for direct investment in European manufacturing show a rising
role of external finance during this period, even before the imposition
of direct-investment controls.)
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since1966, we wouldsaythat the shift rightward of the domestic ME!
schedule (relative to foreign-investment opportunities) would lead to a
shift in the mix of foreign subsidiaries' borrowing toward borrowing
abroad (as well as some reduction in investment abroad) even in the
absence of controls over direct investment. It will be interesting to see
how well the model works with 1967—69 data. Is it not likely that for-
eign and domestic investment behave more like substitutes under these
conditions, even though they did not do so during Severn's period—
that is, 196 1—66?
Next, I want to draw attention to two aspects of the foreign-in-
vestment decision that are slighted in this model but which, I think,
could easily and fruitfully be explicitly incorporated. Severn regards
increases in sales as more permanent (or less transitory) when sales
have been growing steadily for some time in the past. I wonder whether
some of the greater so-called permanence of the demand for foreign in-
vestment, as compared with domestic investment, may not be explained
by the greater oligopoly power of the subsidiaries in their overseas
markets vis-à-vis the parent in the domestic market. The relative sub-
stitutability of domestic investment and the danger of spoiling the do-
mestic market are, of course, the central concern here.
In a longer-run model, domestic and foreign investment may well
be more directly substitutable, in that domestic investment plus ex-
ports is the alternative to new foreign direct investment. (From the
point of view of national welfare—that is the next area for a seminal
paper—the domestic-investment alternative is probably preferable.)
Second (and last), a word on leverage. In this model, leverage
• turns out to be more helpful in explaining foreign investment than do-
mestic investment. Why? I am not satisfied with the typical cost-of-
capital approach (see, e.g., p. 393). Nor can it be attributed merely to
the surge of foreign investment in the last decade: the debt-equity ratio
• of (European manufacturing) subsidiaries vis-à-vis parents was greater
even before that. (The 1957 Census showed a 1: 1 debt-equity ratio for
manufacturing subsidiaries versus a 1:2 ratio for the parent corpora-
tion.) Here again, we return to the risks of devaluation (and confisca-
tion) and to the use of local debt as an offset. Or are there nontransitory
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thatmake it cheaper, or more attractive, for foreign direct investors to
borrow abroad than at home?
Gillespie's paper is essentially a review of the official policies of
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany toward direct foreign in-
vestment, and an attempt to measure the effects of those policies on the
actual stocks and flows of direct investment from the United States to
those countries over the last decade.
My principal over-all reaction to the paper is that he has given far
toomuchconsideration to the stated national policies (to the neglect
of other likely determinants) and too little consideration to the data and
to quantitative analyses. In general, I believe it is more fruitful to pay
greater attention to what economic (and political) units do than to what
they say. And this is especially true in the present case, since, unlike
the author, I do not see much influence of stated policy goals on actual
flows of direct foreign investment to these three countries. It is not
demonstrated, for example, that Gaullist rhetoric and indicative plan-
fling in France have significantly inhibited the flow of direct foreign
investment to France. Nor are other hypotheses formulated, much less
tested.
1. Gillespie concludes that "the impact of the more restrictive
policy is clearly seen in the steady decline of France's share of Amer-
ican direct investment in the EEC countries after 1963 ..." andpre-
sumably through 1967 (since 1968 was France's year of "relevance").
But this is not so clear or impressive to me.
Between 1959 and 1965 (the apex year for French stated restric-
tions) France's share of direct-investment flows was in the (trendless)
range of 2 1 per cent to 28 per cent of the total of such flows to the Eu-
ropean Economic Community. The drop from that range to 12 per cent
and 16 per cent in 1966 and 1967, respectively, can be attributed to a
variety of factors other than stated policy toward direct foreign in-
vestment. Among those factors worth considering are the following:
(a) short-run balance-of-payments problems in the United States (as
well as in France) during a sharp cyclical expansion, with resultant
cost-of-capital effects. For example, direct foreign investment by the
United States (hereafter referred to as DI) may have shifted from
France to Germany because pressures to finance DI abroad increased,440INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
andfinance was cheaper and more available in Germany than in France;
(b)shiftsin investment opportunities toward Germany from France
due to disparate rates of growth of the economies or to differences in
current and expected returns.
Moreover, it should be noted that the absolute amount of direct-
investment flows from the United States to France was twice as high
in 1966/67 as it was in 1958/59. (True, they were three times as high
in 1963—65.)Inreading this paper, one is led to forget that a boom in
foreign direct investment was occurring throughout Europe. The data
on stocks (Table 2) reveal little change in France's position vis-à-vis
the European Economic Community; it is the relative decline in the
share of the United Kingdom that impresses. But here one is likely to
attribute that shift to the evolution of the Common Market rather than
to controls over DI flows.
In short, the role of national policy on direct investment can only
be reasonably isolated in a model that at least accounts for the prin-
cipal causal factors.
2. A study of policy alone, it seems to me, could be more helpful
to the extent that it treated specific cases and did so quantitatively. In
the case of France, Gillespie stresses that the specific targets of the in-
vestment controls were take-overs and the protection of particular sec-
tors, e.g., electronics. But the role of these types of direct investment
in total direct investment in France is not (perhaps cannot be) explored.
Nor is it at all clear to me that (as Gillespie assures us) it is "not pos-
sible to differentiate the economic effects" of take-overs from new cor-
porate investment overseas.
The two types of investment have different effects on the use of
real resources in the host country, even if only in the short run; and
there are surely differences in the effects on the structure of industry,
unless the opening up of a new unit overseas is ruled out as an alter-
native form of direct investment. The volume (as well as the composi-
tion) of investment in the host country will be different if take-over is
substituted for new foreign direct investment. There will also be dif-
ferences in the number of firms, as when entry into the banking system
is permitted via merger rather than requiring the establishment of a
new branch.
There are also differences in the economic effects on the investing
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countrywhen it expands overseas investment by the take-over route
instead of the new-investment path. Take-overs slur the distinction
between foreign portfolio and direct investment; while having the "con-
trol" element associated with direct investment, they share the "finan-
cial" (rather than "real") asset attribute of portfolio investment. Of
course, in the long run, the origins of the subsidiary become irrelevant.
But that is not to say that the short-run distinction is unimportant.
3. One final matter: I fear that Gillespie attributes too much ag-
gregate effectiveness to direct-investment controls of the United States.
On the basis of sources-of-funds data (rather than preliminary balance-
of-payments data), one cannot conclude that American direct invest-
ment in Europe has declined at all through 1968. What one sees is a
shift toward external financing of such investment—from sources at
home to sources abroad. Again it is the structural,likethe sectoral,
aspects that tend to be slighted in the paper, though they are probably
just the areas where the effects of the controls are most significant.
Note that I do not claim that the controls have had no effects. I
do claim, however, that the effects were seldom the advertised or in-
tended ones, and, in any case, can hardly be determined outside of a
reasonably complete model of the investment process.
IS